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Poverty in America has been the focus of considerable
public and scientific attention since the social awareness
boom of the tumultuous sixties. Sociologists and anthropol-
.
ogists have addressed at least two important sets of questions
regarding poverty. First, what are the actual causes of poverty,
and what types of ameliorative social policies are best? Second,
what are American's Interpretation* of poverty determinants,
and what types of ameliorative social policies do people endorse?
A third set of questions that remains relatively unexplored
concern the processes by which people develop interpretations of
poverty. Do people employ sophisticated information-processing
strategies in order to make causal judgments of poverty? And,
do general beliefs about causality affect people's processing
of economic Information about a social group? The present study
attempts to answer these questions regarding the processes
involved in the development of causal judgments about group
poverty and affluence.
While attribution research seems relevant to understanding
interpretations of poverty and affluence, social psychologists
have remained quiet about this important social issue. Therefore,
in the present study, attributions are examined to determine
whether the kind of logical causal analysis useful In explaining
various other events (e.g., Eagly & Chaiken,197^; Kelley,19?l;
KcArthur,1972) Is applicable to this complex social Issue. Do
people determine causality by examining the covariation over
time between a potential cause and economic effect? Are people's
prior beliefs about control over government events Important
determinants of their causal explanations of specific economic
outcomes? These are some of the questions that will be
addressed below.
Ideologies About Poverty
What ideologies do people hold concerning poverty? One
ideology that stresses internal causes regards the poor as
genetically inferior. According to this position, poverty is
ascribed primarily to lack of Innate intelligence. Alternatively,
a more common internal view is the Protestant "work ethic",
which suggests that Individual effort determines the economic
rewards one receives from society. Adherents typically attribute
poverty to laziness which is Inherent in the impoverished indiv-
idual. Frequently, these two views are combined, and the poor
are considered both genetically inferior and innately lazy.
A somewhat more charitable ideology emphasizes internal
causes that are of past environmental origin (e.g., slum life),
rather than an intrinsic defect within the individual. This
view has been labeled "blaming the victim" (Ryan, 1966 ) . For
example, people sometimes believe that group characteristics
and value patterns are transmitted over generations along
family lines. This has been termed a subcultural view by
anthropologists who have investigated the actual causes of
poverty (Lewis, 1966). According to his position, current
poverty is imputed to sources within the person, even though
the condition was derived from the past environment. Current
societal forces, such as inequity in the distribution of
power and resources, are largely ignored. As a result,
adherents endorse social programs aimed at changing the victim
(e.g., preparing the child better for school), rather than
changing the societal structure (e.g.
, preparing the school
better for the child).
In contrast to these internal ideologies, some views
stress structural problems, such as discrimination tad lack of
economic opportunities. Sociologists studying actual poverty
determinants have labeled this a "situational" view (Rossi &
Blum, 1968). Since poverty is ascribed to circumstances beyond
individual control, ameliorative social policies are usually
seen as best geared toward structural changes in society.
Generally, then, "genetic inferiority", "blaming the
victim", and "work ethic" ideologies may protect society from
current blame, while a "situational" view serves to absolve
the individual who is poor.
Considerable evidence suggests that people often develop
self-serving ideologies concerning the genesis of poverty,
though the mechanisms of Ideology development have not been
delineated. Self-serving Ideologies have been documented by
the finding that Americans of different economic levels often
Invoke different explanations of poverty. The particular
Interpretation given by the person usually reflects most
favorably on that individual. Thus, nonpoor Americans tend
to attribute poverty to individual falling (i.e., lack of
effort) rather than factors beyond Individual control, such
as the political and economic system (Ryan.1971). Further,
Schllt* (1.970) found that forty-two percent of all Americans
ascribed poverty exclusively to lack of effort, while only
nineteen percent cited external factors as sole causes. A
self-serving pattern, in which effort attributions became
stronger with increased income, was demonstrated.
Empirical research indicates that socioeconomic factors
which may not be related to self-serving motives are also
important determinants of economic views. Three demographic
characteristics
—age, education , and occupation— have been
found to be directly associated with economic beliefs. In
this regard, Alston and Dean(1972) asked white survey respond-
ents to choose either lack of effort or circumstances beyond
individual control as poverty determinants. Younger people
chose effort over uncontrollable circumstances more often than
did older people. The authors speculated that this tendency
might have resulted from older people's economic experiences
during the depression. That is, those over age fifty might
have remembered when forces beyond individual control caused
widespread unemployment. AlstSr and Dean also found that
education was positively associated with a tendency to choose
effort over external circumstances.
Results on the occupational dimension are somewhat
enigmatic. Not only were responses of skilled and blue
collar workers more external as might be expected, but also
6unexpectedly were those of professional workers, who are
high In both education and income. Further, internal attrib-
utions were most frequently ascribed by lower status white
collar workers and by farmers. This latter finding may be
somewhat unexpected since these groups are relatively low
on the economic ladder.
In general, then, attributions of economic outcomes
follow a self-serving pattern in which the nonpoor tend to
ascribe poverty to individual failing, while the poor often
invoke external explanations. However, some anomalous findings
accrue, and indicate that certain socioeconomic variables
besides income level must be considered in order to adequately
understand the determinants of economic ideologies.
Processes in th e Development of Self-Serving Ideologies
What are the processes by which nonpoor and poor Americans
develop different ideologies about poverty? At least two
possibilities have been proposed. One line of research argues
that individuals differ in terms of the processes by which
they arrive at judgments about poverty. " This view implies
that, given identical information, poor and nonpoor will
arrive at different conclusions that reflect their motivational
biases. A second perspective suggests that individuals
systematically process Information in similar ways, but that
the information available to people in different social classes
may vary. This postuV» tion suggests that alternative interpre-
tations follow from different information.
Social psychological theory concerning stereotypes of
social groups may be useful for elucidating how economic
ideologies develop. Stereotypes are typically defined as
being factually Incorrect and produced through illogical
reasoning (Lippman,1922 ) , or more vaguely as incorrect
generalizations (Katz 8c Braly.1933). These definitions
indicate that it is not clear to researchers investigating
stereotypes whether the process itself is faulty, or whether
the informational basis for the judgment is inaccurate. While
some researchers state that persons who use stereotypes do
not employ objectively rational standards (Brigham, 1971 ) , the
explicit reason for this lack of objectivity has not been
delineated.
That individuals make errors in their interpretations
seems well documented (Abelson,1976
; Chapman & Chapman, 1969,
1976; Kahneman & Tversky ,1971; Peterson & Beach, 1967).
However, there is relatively little empirical support for
the proposition that information processing is systematically
influenced by self-serving motivations ( Miller 3c Ross,1975).
For example, self-serving patterns have not obtained in
attributions of success or failure on anagrams laboratory
achievement tasks (Feather & Simon, 1971). Yet.it may be true
that these laboratory situations have typically not engaged
strong human motives. Perhaps events linked to becoming
poor have strong emotional and motivational Implications.
If that is the case, motivational biases might be important
in economic contexts.
In contrast to motivational interpretations, Kelley's
(1971.1973) theory of causal attributions suggests that varying
interpretations probably follow from differential exposure to
information. This perspective suggests that individuals
process information in a basically rational manner that is
independent of needs or motives which could systematically
bias explanations.
According to this model, observers employ a three-
dimensional classification in order to examine the covariation
between potential causes and effects. This covariation
principle posits that an attribution of a particular effect
will be made to either an entity ( stimulus )
,
person (perc elver
)
or situatlon(time), or some combination of the three. The
attribution will be made on the basis of consistency over
time or occasions, consensus across persons, and distinctiveness
to a particular entity. For example, an effect that occurs
across time or situations (high consistency), and in response
to a particular actor (low consensus) and a wide range of
stimuli (low distinctiveness) , will tend to be ascribed to the
person, Thus, the covariation principle suggests that perceivers
examine multiple possible causes of events by conducting a
subjective analysis of variance on Information arranged in an
Entity X Persons X Situations matrix.
In conceptualizing multiple possible causes, Kelley
Introduced another useful causal distinction. Perceivers
Qsometimes engage in a systematic but simpler analysis in
terms of the plausibility of potential causes. Two types
of causes —facilitative and inhibitory- may obtain in
the person, entity, situation or any combination of the three.
While an inhibitory cause must be overcome in order to achieve
a particular outcome, a facilitative cause furthers that end.
Kelley' s Augmentation Principle suggests an alternative to
a complex analysis of variance in causal evaluation i " If for
a given effect, both a plausible inhibitory cause and a
plausible facilitative cause are present, the role of the
facilitative cause in producing the effect will be judged
greater than if it alone were present as a plausible cause
for the effect" (Kelley, 1972, p. 12).
From Kelley* s perspective, then, it seems reasonable to
argue that lay attributors perform an analysis similar to
that conducted by scientists in identifying cause and effect
relations. Deploying Kelley* s model in economic contexts,
the present paper suggests that alternative interpretations
may derive from different information. Why, then, in develop-
ing self-serving ideologies, might poor and nonpoor be exposed
to different information about economic situations? One view
proposes that people selectively expose themselves to self-
enhancing or belief-confirming information(Freedman & Sears,
197D. Festinger (1957) proposed that people who hold conflict
ing beliefs experience dissonance and a motivation to eliminate
the unpleasant state. One way to reduce dissonance (or avoid
it in the future) is to seek information that is supportive
of one's belief structure. Poor people might seek information
that suggests poverty should be ascribed to societal factors.
In contrast, the rich might search for information that credits
personal ability or initiative for economic success.
An alternative possibility is that the poor and rich
develop dissimilar views due to exposure that is representative
of their own experiences, rather than selective exposure.
That is, the rich and poor may typically examine the covariation
between effort and economic outcome, and logically arrive at
different attributions. The poor, who are aware of their
own considerable striving toward economic success, may perceive
that the lack of correspondence between effort and outcome
results from a malevolent environment. In contrast, the rich,
who may be unaware of effort expended by the poor, could
assume that lack of effort caused poverty. The rich may
assume that effort typically results in economic gain, since
that is what appears to have happened to them.
Exposure that is representative of people's experiences,
then, could yield divergent explanations by the poor and rich.
This analysis suggests that, through media or educational
experiences, high status individuals may become aware of
effort deployed by the poor, and therefore embrace external
explanations. This interpretation might explain the finding
that high status professionals invoke external explanations
for poverty.
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Ideological Influences on Processing
How might prior ideologies and beliefs affect the
processing of economic information? Kelley(l 97 3 ) noted that,
when a complete analysis is not undertaken, people may utilize
prior information for inferences. These "assumed patters of
data in a complete Analysis of Variance framework" (Kelley, 1973,
P. 152) were labeled "schemata". Kelley also proposed that
the process Implied by his Analysis of Variance model is
appropriate only when the person conducts a full scale analysis.
Therefore, the process may not occur in many everyday situations.
With regard to poverty attributions, schemata might consist
of ideologies concerning personal control. These prior tenden-
cies could be measured by Rotter* s (1966 ) Internal- External
(I-E) Scale, which taps individual differences in the generalized
belief that a person can control his/her own destiny. Genetic,
work ethic, and victim-blaming ideologies all seem consistent
with a belief in internal control. Conversely, a situational
ideology seems congruent with an external orientatiim.
The schemata notion seems consistent with Jones and
Cook's (1975) social judgment theory analysis of poverty
attributions and related policy preferences. These authors
investigated the effects of racial attitudes on causal explan-
ations for black/white socioeconomic disparity. Further, they
asked respondents to rate the relative effectiveness of
self-improvement and societal-change social policies. Results
indicated that white subjects' negative attitudes toward blacks
were associated with internal causal explanations and preferences
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for self-improvement pollcles> jones ^^ argued ^
racial attitudes functioned as anchors ln ta
tatlons of facts. In thls marmer
, prlop ^ ^
an ambiguous event suggest an interpretation that i s consent
with the preexisting belief structure. The sociaX judgment
theory analysis goes one step beyond causal emanations to
the judged effectiveness of remedial social policies. The
formulation suggests that ideological beliefs can affect
evaluations of programs aimed at alleviating poverty. Generally.
externals might prefer societal-change ameliorative policies,
while internals might embrace self-improvement policies. In I
terms of Kelley's theory, prior racial attitudes (or beliefs
about personal control) may function as schemata in affecting
interpretations of ambiguous situations.
When do attrlbutors rely on existing schemata? One
problem with the Analysis of Variance model Is that it does
not specify when an individual suspends schemata in order to
gather more information and make a full scale analysis.
Kelley(l 9?3J suggested that a person may not deem many everyday
situations sufficiently Important to warrant time-consuming
gathering, retrieving, and processing of Information. The
person might then utilize schemata when the available data
are incomplete.
A second possibility is that self-serving motivations
could dictate whether individuals will seek more information
or utilize existing schemata. That Is, people may seek further
data only when their needs or motives are not satisfied. But
In some(or perhaps most) cases, such "selective exposure-
might actually reflect people's "rational" processing. One
could argue that ideologies Indicate what type of information
Is relevant to the problem at hand. Internals may feel that
Information about environmental changes is an inadequate basis
for judgments, and that individual difference information is
necessary. In the laboratory, they might resort to ideological
notions as schemata in their analysis. However, if given the
chance, they might seek exposure to individual difference
information. In contrast, externals may feel that information
about the environment is sufficient. Thus, externals may
utilize environmental information more strongly than Internals.
In sum, the present study examines the processes by which
people develop interpretations of poverty and affluence. It
is argued that, in general, people systematically examine the
covariation between potential causes and economic effects
in order to ascribe causality. Further, prior beliefs that
persons hold concerning control may be important determinants
of attributions in ambiguous cases, or when individuals do
not conduct a full scale analysis.
Design
The preceding analysis indicates that laboratory subjects
should be responsive to information concerning the covariation
of cause and effect in economic contexts. Two potential
causes emerge from the above discussion. One cause concerns
changes in environmental resources and opportunities over
generations, while another might be internal characteristics
such as abilities and personal initiative, of a social group!
In the present study, subjects were given Information
about the Raetoromanen, an obscure social group living 1„
western Austria. One group of subjects was told that the
group is currently poor, while other subjects were told that
they are presently affluent. Both groups were given informa-
tion about changes in the group's income and opportunities
over the past fifty years. All subjects were told that
opportunities have either improved or declined. Further,
when the group is presently poor, incomes were described as
having either declined or remained constant. But when Raetor-
omanen are currently rich, the economic situation was presented
as either having improved or remained constant over time.
Thus, combinations of these variables provided a total of
eight descriptions ( See Table 1).
In addition, two control conditions that received no
opportunity or income change information were included to
provide baseline data. These conditions were a poverty and
affluence control that were only told the present economic
state of the group.
The covariation principle suggests that poverty or
affluence will be attributed to environmental changes when
there is a covariation of income and opportunity (e.g., both
improve or both decline). The augmentation principle indicates
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that negative covariation should generate strong Internal
ascriptions. This result might occur when income improves
while opportunity declines. In such a case, a facilitate
internal attribute should be seen as effective despite
opposing inhibitory opportunities.
Following the logic of the augmentation principle, when
income remains constant (and opportunities either improve or
decline), internal attributions should result from the
noncovariatlon. A facilitate internal attribute should be
viewed effective in holding incomes constant despite declining
inhibitory opportunities. However, this Internal attribute
would be judged stronger when incomes actually improved in
the face of declining inhibitory opportunities ( ie. negative
covariation)
.
The present study, then, proposes that subjects 1 causal
Inferences are an outcome or consequence of a systematic
cause and effect analysis. Specifically, it is hypothesized
that stronger external (and weaker internal) causal attributions
will obtain when economic outcome covaries positively with
opportunity compared with stable outcome conditions compared
with the condition in which economic outcome covaries negatively
with opportunity. As a secondary focus, this study examines
respondents 1 social policy preferences. In this regard, it is
hypothesized that a stronger preference for societal-change
(vs. individual-change) ameliorative social policies will be
demonstrated by positive covariation compared with stable
16
outcome compared with negative covariation subjects.
Regarding treatment comparisons with controls, stronger
internal (and weaker external) attributions are expected for
control subjects compared with positive covariation subjects.
In contrast, weaker Internal (and stronger external) attributions
are predicted for control versus stable outcome or negative
covariation subjects. Further, control(vs. positive covariation)
subjects should more strongly endorse societal-change policies,
while endorsement of these policies should be weaker for control
compared with stable outcome and negative covariation subjects.
t
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Method
Design
Two experimental designs comprise this research. Subjects
in the first design were told that Raetoromanen are currently
affluent, while those in the second design learned that the
group is currently Impoverished. When the group is currently
affluent, a 2(improved vs. declined opportunities) X 2(lmproved
vs. constant income) plus control group(no information regarding
income changes or opportunity changes) between-sub Jects design
was utilized. When Raetoromanen are currently experiencing
Poverty, the study employed a 2(improved vs. declined opportunities)
X-2(decllned vs. constant Income) plus control group(no informa-
tion regarding income changes or opportunity changes) between-
subjects design.
Prior to selection of the final design, one-hundred and
twenty pilot subjects provided data about a fictitious social
group. All members in that group were described as being
impoverished. The design was a 3(lmproved vs. declined vs.
constant opportunities) X 3(lmproved vs. declined vs. constant
income) plus control group (no opportunity change or income
change information) between-sub Jects design. Although data
trends were In expected directions, significant effects were
not found. On the basis of those data, it seemed reasonable
that stronger manipulations would provide a superior design.
To this end, the final design described larger changes in
opportunities and income over time. The improved income
18
condition involving the currently Impoverished group „as
necessarily absent. That condition was replaced with an
improved Income description Involving current affluence.
Further, constant income conditions were Included In both
poverty and affluence designs In order to compare people's
general theories of poverty and affluence.
Sub.iects
One-hundred fifty male and female University of Massachusetts
undergraduate psychology students participated for experimental
course credit during the Fall semester, 19?7.
Experimental p rocedure
Participants were recruited for an experiment entitled
"information about a social group". Questionnaires were
administered in sessions containing up to fifteen subjects.
Each participant received one of ten different versions
(representing the various experimental conditions) of a booklet
containing the experimental materials.
All booklets began with a three paragraph description of
the Haetoromanen, an obscure ethnic group that (supposedly)
constitutes three percent of the Austrian population. Within
these parapgraphs, customs and traditions of the group were
described (see appendix 1 for complete description). The
information was intentionally ambiguous and neutral with
respect to causal judgments of poverty or affluence. This
background information gave people facts that could add plaus-
ibility and support to theories that might result from experimental
Information or prior ideologies.
Next subjects were told that surveys concerning the
Raetoroman economic situation were published both fifty years
ago and last year. Information describing the current incomelaunch or poor) and ej^^^
^
remained constant) were given.
After reading the appropriate version of the above informa-
tion, subjects were given information describing opportunity^ °V6r tlme ' In to facilitate comprehension, a
brief summary of background information, opportunity and income
changes, and the present economic situation, was provided. To
firthcr reinforce information in subjects' minds, and to ascertain
whether they received information, subjects answered five
multiple choice questions about income level and changes, and
opportunity changes. They scored their own answers by referring
to the preceding descriptions.
Subsequently, subjects rated the importance of various
causal determinants of either poverty or affluence. Further,
self
-perceptions of control, and ratings of own income, were
provided by subjects. Finally, subjects who learned that the
Raetoromanen are currently poor indicated their endorsement of
individual-change and societal-change ameliorative social policies.
Independent Variables
Group, income level and income changes
. One parapgraph
described the group's present income level
—"distinctly above
average" (affluence) or "distinctly below average" (poverty )—
20
and provided income chanSe Information. Incomes either
improved (used i„ affluence conditions), declined (used in
poverty conditions), or remained constant (used in both designs).
For example, in conditions In which incomes improved and
the group is currently affluent-, participants read the following
paragraph t
The surveys demonstrated some important facts about the
economic situation. Fifty years ago, most Raetoromanen
were poor. In comparison vith other Austrians, Raetoroman
incomes were distinctly below average. Since that time, I
however, Raetoroman incomes have Improved considerably.
Now Raetoromanen are very comfortable economically. In
relation to other members of Austrian society, Raetoromanen
are distinctly above average.
Aside from differences in Income level and Income change
information, the content of each version was essentially
identical (see appendix 2).
Opportunity Changes. Subjects were told that opportunities
either improved or declined over the fifty year period. For
example, the passage describing improved opportunities read as
follows I
The surveys and numerous government reports showed that
the opportunities available to Raetoromanen have an
interesting history. Over the last fifty years, opportunities
have actually improved a great deal. This improvement
in opportunities stemmed from increased funding coming
to the western region from government sources. m
Austria, most taxes go to the federal government, which
then redistributes money to the different regions for
various purposes. In recent decades, the federal govern-
ment substantially increased funds to the western region
where Raetoromanen live, As a result, schools were able
to Improve teaching quality, reduce class size, and provide
students better materials and physical conditions
. Further
financial aid enabled many more Raetoromanen to attend the
Gymnasium(high schools) and universities. There were also
efforts to stimulate regional industries and tourism.
Money for vocational training was also rrade available, and
legislative efforts were directed toward eliminating any
job discrimination.
The content of the description 0f declining opportunities was
essentially Identical except for the crucial information (see
appendix 3),
Measuring Instruments
Causal Inferences. Respondents rated the responsibility
of two types of potential causal factors of Raetoroman income.
One factor concerned "ability levels or degree of personal
initiative that stems from enduring traditions or sometimes
inherited causes", while the other regarded " resources or
opportunities that society provides.' Subjects rated each of
these two types of factors by marking two separate 15-point
scales, anchored by "very much responsible" and "not at all
22
responsible"
.
Trait listing. Subjects were asked to list all the
traits or characteristics that might apply to the Raetoromanen,
based on the information that they read. Further, respondents
evaluated each trait by marking a 15-point scale anchored by
"extremely good" and "extremely bad".
Ratings of specific causal determinants
. Subjects indicated
the importance, on 5-polnt scales, of the following twelve
potential causal determinants of (appropriately) poverty or
affluence
i education, job availability, intelligence and
ability, effort, neighborhood conditions, discrimination,
luck, ghettoizatlon and physical isolation, alienation,
aspirations, health problems, and political power.
Own income rating. Subjects were asked to characterize
their own economic situation over the course of their lifetime.
The scale contained seven points anchored by "rich" and "poor".
Locus of control scale
. Respondents completed a 9-item
Likert scale that measures the system dimension of the Internal-
External personality variable. This dimension was extracted
from Gurln*s(1975) factor analysis of Rotter* r (1966 ) original
I-E scale. In contrast to a personal dimension, the system
factor concerns governmental end societal events. Subjects
responses to the nine item locus of control scale were summed
to provide one overall measure. The internal consistency of
the scale proved high, as tested by Coef f icient (Cronback, 19 ).
23
Policy, preferences
.
Subjects receiving information that
the group is currently poor gave additional data. Endorsement
of two types of social policies was measured on two 15-point
scales which ranged from "not at all endorse" to "very much
endorse", with midpoint labeled "somewhat endorse". The
description of the two policies read as follows
i
An Individual
-change policy would stress changes in the
behavior of the individual who Is poor as the best way
to eliminate poverty. Those in favor of this view might
endorse job training programs or Individual counseling to
change work-related values, attitudes and behavior.
A societal -change policy might suggest that legislation
be enacted to alter economic conditions. Such legislation
might involve insuring an adequate job and income to the
poor by hiring quotas, job provision programs or guaranteed
annual income programs.
Finally, relative endorsement of the two policies was assessed.
Subjects indicated the percentage of the total available money
that they would advise be spent on individual-change and
societal-change policies.
/
2k
Results
The analyses employed two separate 2 X 2 factorial
designs, each including the external control or comparison
group. Hypotheses concerning affluence condition subjects
were explored by an opportunity (improved vs. declined) X
income (improved vs. constant) analysis of variance and
appropriate contrasts. All analyses were conducted with the
(no information) control condition included in the error term.
In a similar manner, hypotheses concerning poverty condition
subjects were explored by an opportunity ( improved vs. declined)
X income (declined vs. constant) analysis of variance and app-
ropriate contrasts, with control subjects again included in
the error term. Further, planned contrasts across affluence
and poverty designs were conducted where appropriate. In
these contrasts, all experimental and control subjects from
both designs were included in the error term.
Causal Inferences
In conditions in which the group was described as affluent,
analysis of subjects 1 rating of the responsibility of internal
causes yielded an Income X Opportunity interaction, F(l,59): 7.47,
p<.01. As predicted, planned comparisons revealed that weaker
internal ascriptions were given in positive covariation compared
with stable outcome conditions (p.. 01 ) . Further, weaker internal
attributions obtained for positive compared with negative
~§tjvariation sub-jects-, as expected (p~# 01 » , Contrary to
25
predictions, no difference obtained for combined stable
outcome conditions compared with the negative covariation
condition.
Dunnetf s procedure showed that only the positive
covariation condition differed significantly from the baseline
control <p<. 01). Subjects in that cell gave weaker internal
ascriptions than did control subjects, as expected.
Analysis of affluence subjects* rating of the effect
of external causes on the current economic state revealed a
significant opportunity main effect, F(l, 59). 31. 64,p=,000.
External factors were perceived to be more important by
opportunity improved than by opportunity declined subjects.
Not only did the opportunity effect hold as predicted within
improved income conditions, Simple F(4,72)=8.68,p<.01, but
also unexpectedly within stable outcome conditions (p*. 01 )
.
This latter difference suggests that contrasts in which stable
outcome cells are combined would not be appropriate.
Regarding treatment comparisons with the control, Dunnett's
test revealed that the negative covariation condition showed
significantly weaker external ascriptions than the control,
as predicted (p< . 01 ) . In addition, the stable outcome cell
involving declined opportunity demonstrated as expected
marginally weaker external attributions than did the control
(p=.07). Contrary to predictions, stable outcome subjects
receiving improved opportunity information gave significantly
stronger external attributions than did control subjects.
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Finally, m contrast to results for the Internal variable,
the positive covariation condition did not differ from the
control.
For subjects receiving information that the group is
currently poor, analysis of variance revealed a significant
opportunity main effect for the internal dependent measure,
F(1,59)=1^5,P=.001. This effect indicated that internal
causes of poverty were judged more important when opportunity
improved than when opportunity declined. Opportunity simple
effects held as expected within the conditions in which Income
declined, Simple F(4,72)- 8.45,p<.01, but also contrary to
predictions within stable outcome conditlons(p=.001). Finally,
Dunnett*s test indicated that the two conditions In which
opportunity Improved each differed significantly from the
control (p=. 002). Improved opportunity subjects gave stronger
Internal attributions than did control subjects.
Poverty condition subjects' rating of the causal responsi-
bility of external factors yielded a significant opportunity
main effect, and indicated that external forces were judged
more important when opportunity declined than when opportunity
improved (p=.000). Once again, expected opportunity simple
effects obtained within income declined conditions, simple
F(4,70)=7.92,p«.000, while unanticipated opportunity effects
were present within stable outcome conditions (p=. 000 ) . Finally,
Dunnett's procedure Indicated that conditions involving improved
opportunity differed significantly from the control (p* s=. 01 )
.
weaker external attributions were glven by lmpr.ved opportunlty
compared with control subjects.
Subjects* rating of their own income over the course of
their lifetime was not predictive of causal inferences or
policy preferences. Therefore, that variable will not be
discussed below.
Comparisons across affluence and poverty designs demonstrated
numerous significant differences. Affluence control subjects
judged internal factors considerably more important than did
poverty control subjects (p= .001). Further, analyses across
declined opportunity conditions involving stable outcome showed
that affluence condition subjects gave stronger internal attrib-
utions than did their poverty condition counterparts (p<. 001 )
.
However, Improved opportunity conditions involving stable
outcome did not differ across designs.
Analyses on the external dependent variable showed
significant differences across stable outcome conditions. In
stable outcome conditions in which opportunity declined,
poverty condition subjects gave stronger external attributions
than did affluence sub jects (p<. 001 ) . In contrast, stable
outcome affluence subjects receiving improved opportunity
manipulations gave stronger external attributions than poverty
subjects in the parallel condition (p<. 001 )
.
Ratings of specific causal determinants
A multivariate analysis of variance was performed on the
twelve specific causal determinants, and only effects yielding
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a significant multivariate F are reported.
In conditions in which the group was described as being
currently affluent, the opportunity main effect was significant
on three variables (education, Jobs, ability ,p
-
s <.
0
5 ) , and
marginal on one (aspirations ,p=. 07) . Further, an Income X
Opportunity Interaction was revealed by analyses of two variables
(Jobs, education,p. s <.01 ). The opportunity main effect
indicates that internal causes (ie. ability, aspirations) were
judged more important determinants of affluence when opportunities
declined than when opportunities improved. Conversely, attrib-
ution to external determinants (ie. education, jobs) was weaker
when opportunities declined than when opportunities improved.
As predicted, two external variables (education, jobs) demon- .-
strated simple opportunity effects only for improved income
conditions.
Analyses of poverty conditions revealed significant
opportunity main effects on four dependent measures ( education,
jobs, aspirations, effort, p's<.01). These findings show
that external factors (ie. education, jobs) were judged more
causally Important in conditions in which opportunity declined
compared with conditions in which opportunity Improved. Further,
Internal factors (ie. aspirations, effort) were judged less
important in the opportunity declined compared with opportunity
improved condition. For all four variables, not only did these
opportunity effects hold as predicted within the conditions
in which income declined(p<. 05 ) , but also unexpectedly within
the stable outcome condition (p<. 05 )
.
Several planned contrasts across poverty and affluence
designs indicated once more that subjects' interpretations of
opportunity and income information depends on the group's
current income level. In this regard, attributions for two
variables (ie. education, discrimination) were stronger for
poverty condition control subjects than for affluence condition
control subjects (p's<. 05). Conversely, attribution for one
internal factor ( ie .aspirations ) was weaker for poverty
compared with affluence controls (p<.
0
5 ) . These results indicate
that subjects tend to invoke internal explanations for affluence,
and external explanations for poverty. However, one anomalous
finding was revealedt attribution for the luck variable was
stronger for affluence control than for poverty control subjects
(p<.01).
Further evidence for the above pattern is revealed by
contrasts across rich and poor conditions involving declined
opportunity and stable outcome. Significant differences on
four dependent measures were obtained (ability, effort, isolation,
aspirations, p»s<.001). These findings demonstrated that internal
determinants (ie. ability, effort, aspirations) were judged
more Important by affluence compared with poverty subjects,
while an external variable (ie. isolation) was perceived less
important by the affluence subjects than by their poverty
counterparts.
Finally, contrasts across Improved opportunity conditions
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in which income remained stable revealed significant diff-
erences on four varlables( ability, isolation, education,
Jobs,p's<.05). Consistent with tho above findings, affluence
subjects judged ability more Important, and isolation less
important, than did poverty subjects. In contrast to the
overall pattern, affluence subjects also judged education and
Jobs more important than did poverty subjects.
Policy preferences
in conditions in which subjects received information that
the group is currently poor, opportunity ma in effects were
significant on three policy-related variables ( individual-
change endorsement, individual-change and societal-change
percent allocation( p's<.0 5 ), and marginal on one (societal-
change endorsement, p=. 07). These effects Indicated that
individual-change social policies were more strongly endorsed
when opportunity improved than when opportunity declined.
Conversely, endorsement of societal-change policies was weaker
when opportunity improved than when opportunity declined.
The expected simple opportunity effects achieved significance
only within declined income conditions for two variables
(individual-change and societal-change percent allocation,
P*s<.05). However, contrary to predictions, simple effects
tests revealed that the opportunity effect held only within
constant income conditions for one variable ( individual-
change percent allocation, p=
. 05 )
.
Individual differences in locus of control
On the basis of the overall scores on the locus of
control scale, subjects were split at the median into two
approximately equal-sized groups
-external (above median)
and internal (below median) locus of control. The analyses
below employed two separate 2X2X2 factorial designs
(Opportunity X Income X Locus of Control), each including
the (no information) control group.
Causal Inferences. In conditions in which subjects received
information that the group is currently affluent, analyses
of the internal cause variable revealed an unpredicted
Income X Opportunity X Locus of control interaction, F(l,5^=
8.03,p<.05. Simple effects tests revealed that the previously
reported Opportunity X Income Interaction obtained only within
internal locus of control conditions (p<. 01 )
.
Regarding affluence condition subjects 1 rating of the
responsibility of external causes, simple. effects tests
revealed that the opportunity main effect held for internals
under both constant and improved income conditions (p»s=.000),
as well as for externals under both levels of income (p=. 02 )
.
Further, Dunnett's procedure revealed that only internal locus
of control subjects receiving negative covariation information
differed from the appropriate control (p<. 05 ) . As predicted,
the negative covariation subjects showed weaker external
i
ascriptions than control subjects.
In conditions in which the group was portrayed as currently
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poor, the internal cause variable showed a significant
Opportunity x Locus of control interaction, P(l, 52)=7 .44,
P<.01. This interaction indicated that opportunity simple
effects were stronger within internal locus of control
conditions compared with external locus of control conditions.
Dunnetf s test Indicated that internal as well as external
locus of control subjects in the stable outcome condition
involving Improved opportunity gave stronger internal attrib-
utions than their respective control <p«. 01). Further, internals
receiving negative covariation information gave stronger
internal attributions than did control subjects (p^.01).
Regarding comparisons for the internal variable across
affluence and poverty designs, affluence control subjects
across both levels of locus of control judged internal factors
more important than did their poverty control counterparts
(p=.000). Further, across both levels of locus of control,
affluence subjects receiving declined opportunity and stable
outcome information gave stronger internal attributions than
their poverty counterparts.
Analysis of the external variable under poverty conditions
revealed no significant main or interaction effects involving
the locus of control variable. Comparisons across designs
for the external variable demonstrated that poverty (vs. affluence)
subjects across both levels of locus of control gave stronger
external attributions in conditions in which opportunity
declined and income remained stable. Further, across both
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levels of locus of control, stable outcome affluence subjects
receiving improved opportunity information gave stronger
attributions than their poverty condition counterparts.
Hating of specific causal determinant.
. A multivariate
analysis of variance was performed on the twelve specific
causal determinants, and onlv effect* h.i^t uu u iy nec s yielding a significant
multivariate F are reported.
Only in conditions in which the Raetoromanen were described
as currently affluent did effects involving the locus of
control variable achieve significance. Locus of control main
effects proved significant on two variables (ability
,
effort,
P
f S«.01) f and indicated that these two internal causes were
judged to be more important determinants of affluence by
internal compared with external locus of control subjects.
Regarding the importance of jobs on the economic outcome,
simple effects tests indicated that the previously reported
opportunity main effect held only within internal locus of
control conditions (p=. 001). This effect shows that jobs were
judged more important when opportunities improved than when
opportunities declined.
Finally, an unexpected Income X Opportunity X Locus of
control interaction obtained for the education variable. A
simple effects test revealed that the previously reported
Income X Opportunity interaction proved significant only
within internal locus of control sub jects (p<r. 05 ) . That is,
within internal locus of control conditions, improved (vs.
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declined) opportunity subjects 3ave strong attributions
only under improved income conditions.
/
The present study examines how individuals process cause
and effect information in economic contexts. Prom Kellers
-del of causal attributions, we derived that economic causal
ascriptions would be a product of a systematic analysis of the
covariation of a potential cause and the economic effect (outcome
)
Subjects were told that an obscure social group is either
currently affluent or impoverished, when the
.roup is currently
affluent, incomes were described as having either improved
or remained constant over a fifty year period, ^en the
.roup
is currently impoverished, incomes either declined or remained
constant over time. Further, all subjects were told that
opportunities (e.g., jobs, education) either improved or
declined over time.
Respondents therefore received one of three general types
of information, (1) Positive covariation
, Opportunity and
income both declined, or both improved, over time, (2) Negative
covariation
,
Opportunity improved while income declined, or
opportunity declined while income improved, and (3) stable
outcome 1 income did not change over generations, while
opportunity either improved or declined.
Causal Inferences
Primary dependent measures investigated subjects 1 causal
attributions of poverty or affluence. Two kinds of economic
causes were investigated! internal
, such as ability or initiative,
and external, such as opportunities. Stronger external (and
°6
weaker internal) causal attributions were expected for
positive covariation compared with stable outcome compared
with negative covariation conditions.
Regarding causal attributions of poverty, the results
as a whole, indicate that Internal causes were judged more
important when group opportunity impr0ved as opposed to declined
over time. In contrast, regarding attributions of affluence,
external causes were judged more important when opportunities
improved than when opportunities declined. Thus, subjects
employed opportunity Information in conjunction with current
income level information. Income change information had no
significant impact on judgments.
Why did subjects fail to employ income change information
in their analyses? One possible explanation might be that
they did not receive the information. However, manipulation
checks documented that subjects received both opportunity
change (98.52) and income change (96%) information. Therefore,
a more adequte explanation of subjects* selective utilization
of information is warranted.
A better explanation for the differential use of
information might be that income change information was less
sallent to subjects than was opportunity change information.
In addition to sentences that summarized the information,
the stimulus materials regarding income changes were only one
sentence in length, while opportunity change materials entailed
one paragraph. The shorter length of income change information
may have resulted in low salience to subjects.
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A third interpretation may be- that subjects' information
processing capacities are limited, and so they selectively
utilize information in order to reduce complex judgments
to simpler operations. Subjects may either be unable or
not motivated to perform the relatively complex judgmental
operations that are involved in an analysis of covariation
between cause and effect, and may therefore adopt a simplifylng
strategy, one strategy might be to employ opportunity change
information in conjunction with current outcome level information.
This possibility that subjects used simple information processing
strategies will be discussed in detail below.
Social Policy Preferences
Social policy preferences were provided only by poverty
condition subjects. Stronger endorsement of societal-change
(and weaker endorsement of individual-change) social policies
was predicted for positive covariation compared with stable
outcome compared with negative covariation subjects. Results
showed that support for societal-change policies was weaker
when opportunity improved than when opportunity declined.
Conversely, improved opportunity subjects gave stronger support
to individual-change policies than did declined opportunity
subjects. Thus, only opportunity-change information in
conjunction with current outcome level knowledge had an
impact on policy choices.
Comparisons across Affluence and Poverty Designs
For the internal and external causal inference variables,
comparisons across parallel affluence and poverty
revaaxe, several important ^
subjects JUdged internal factors less impurtant externai
factors. This rinding Indicates that people hold theories
that surest that external forces are much
.ore important
determinants of poverty than are Internal forces. In addition,
declined opportunity subjects in poverty conditions judged
internal and external causes about as important as did their
respective controls. This Indicates that people may assume
that opportunity decline causes poverty, given no specific
causal information. This assumption by subjects may reflect
a "group-enhancing" pattern in which people choose the particular
explanation that casts the group in the most favorable light.
Regarding affluence control judgments, internal causes
were judged slightly (but nonslgnificantly ) more important than
external causes. This result indicates that intuitive theories
people hold about affluence are less clearly defined than their
theories of poverty, why might people hold clearer theories
about poverty than about affluence? People may look for causes
more strongly when they must explain a bad outcome( ie. poverty),
and suggest a way to produce change. Less attention may be
given to ascribing causes for good outcomes (le. affluence)
because change is not generally desired. Given the abundance
of literature that analyzes poverty, and the relative scarcity
of discussions about affluence, this interpretation may be
reasonable.
To further investigate how interpretations of poverty
and affluence may differ, comparisons across parallel
opportunity declined and opportunity improved conditions
were made. Regarding declined opportunity conditions,
affluence subjects judged internal causes more important,
and external determinants less important, than their poverty
condition counterparts. These findings can be termed "group-
enhancing" since the group was credited for affluence, while
the environment was blamed for poverty. Regarding improved
opportunity conditions, for the internal variable, no differences
were found across constant income conditions, but for the
external variable, the reverse of a group
-enhancing effect was
obtainedi external causes were judged more Important by
affluence compared with poverty subjects.
These results, then, provide moderate support for a
group-enhancing pattern of causal attributions. The strongest
evidence for this pattern is shown by examining control
judgments in poverty conditions. Further, there is some
support for the notion that people's attributions are group-
enhancing when comparing across opportunity decline and
opportunity improve .conditions
,
though some anomalous findings
were noted.
Why were attributions group-enhancing? In this regard,
it is interesting that subjects appear not to have employed
any of the previously mentioned economic ideologies. Genetic,
work ethic, and victim-blaming Ideologies stress internal
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causes of econo.ic outco.es. According to these vie»s
both poverty and affluence result fro. internal causes' l„
contrast, a situational ideology usually vlews outcomes t(J fee
a consequence of sociological forces. Supporters of this
viewpoint e.brace external explanations for both poverty and
affluence. None of these ideologies, then, can exnlain a
tendency for subjects to ascribe Internal causes for affluence
and external causes for poverty.
In light of the response pattern, other explanations are
required. One motivational interpretation stresses that
attributions are systematically affected by needs or desires.
Why might observers consider group-enhancing ascriptions to
'
be desirable? One could argue that motivations to be charitable
were important. A desire to be lenient or kind might induce
subjects to give the group credit for success or absolve them
from blame for failure.
A different motivational interpretation might suggest
that these people used their attributions in a self-protective
manner. That is, since college students* economic future is
frequently uncertain, attributions could, protect their future
self-image if poverty occurred for them. If this strategy
frequently operates, we would expect the pattern to be weaker
for people who feel that their economic future is certain.
In such cases, affluent people should generally invoke internal
economic causes while poor people embrace external explanations.
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An alternative cognitive explanation can be posited.
In tu, resard
.
one oould arWfi fchat> ^ ^^ ^ ^
learning, people hold certain beliefs about why groups are
poor or affluent. Our subjects might have assumed that the
group expended effort toward economic success. Therefore,
they may have reasoned that economic failure could only
accrue when success was thwarted by the environment. Either
motivational or cognitive explanations, then, seem reasonable.
This research does not test these alternative Interpretations.
Comparisons with control groups
In order to examine whether differences between Improved
and declined opportunity conditions are accounted for primarily
In terms of the Impact of improved opportunity information
or declined opportunity information, each experimental condition
was compared with the appropriate (no information) baseline
control No significant effects were found within affluence
conditions, and most variables within poverty conditions did
not demonstrate significant effects. Thus, no strong conclusion
regarding this Issue is warranted. Nevertheless, within poverty
conditions only, results for the internal and external causal
inference variables showed that only conditions in which oppor-
tunity improved differed from the control. As expected, these
subjects gave stronger internal (and weaker external) ascriptions
of poverty than did control subjects. These results, then,
indicate that improved opportunity information had primary
impact on subjects judgments about poverty, in ambiguous cases,
subjects may assume that declining opportunities cause
poverty. This assumption
-could follow cognitively from
past learning, or it could reflect a motivational bias
toward charity.
Individual differences
Results regarding individual differences showed that
locus of control was generally a weak predictor of subjects-
responses. Overall, a relatively small number of significant
results were obtained. It was predicted that stronger internal
(and weaker external) attributions and preference for individual-
change social policies would be demonstrated by internals compared
with externals. In accord with predictions, two internal causes -
ability and effort
- were judged more important determinants
of affluence by internal compared with external locus of control
subjects
.
Further, several previously reported findings involving
the effects of opportunity and income information either were
absent or weaker within external subjects. Regarding the
internal cause variable, the tendency- for improved opportunity
subjects to more strongly ascribe internal causes of poverty
was found to be significantly stronger among internals relative
to externals. In addition, only internals judged jobs more
important when opportunities improved than when opportunities
declined. Further, regarding internal causes of affluence,
only within internal cells did improved (vs. declined) opportunity
subjects give stronger attributions under improved income
conditions. Finally, the tendency for improved opportunity
subjects to .ore strongly endorse internal poverty determinants
held only for internal subjects. The above results generally
run contrary to initial speculation that externals Bight
utilize environmental information to a greater degree than
internals #
Why did internals employ opportunity and income information
more strongly than externals? There is some evidence that
internals and externals use different cognitive strateglas to
gather and process information. In a recent review of the I-E
literature, Strickland(l 977) found that internals take more
time to deliberate about decisions in difficult, skill-demanding,
or intellectual tasks. Further, these people are more likely
than externals to recall salient experimental information
(Seeman,1963j Seeman & Evans, 1962). Strickland concluded that,
in general, internals depend more heavily on their own abilities
and interpretations of demands, and focus more on the relevant
stimulus cues of a task. With regard to the present findings,
it seems reasonable to argue that our Internals focused more
heavily on the given information, and took more time to
deliberate about the causal judgments and policy decision that
they were asked to make. This interpretation would explain
the stronger effects among internals.
Own income rgeasure
Ratings of subjects* own income proved ineffective as a
predictor of responses. Given the survey evidence mentioned
same, re.ardln* rloh/poor dlfferences ^ expianations>
thl. fta41ng is unexpected. One speculative expiation 1.
that tne "ricn" and "poor" group s of subj ects did not differ
-en in actuai income, since tney oMe from relatlvely
backgrounds.
General discussion
The present study provi.es moderate support for hypotheses
that subjects causal attributions and policy preferences would
result from a systematic analysis of the covariation of a
potential cause and the economic effect. Subjects performed
a cause and effect analysis at a sin,le time point by examining
a potential cause (opportunl ty charges) and the current income
level, without regard to covariation over time. it may be
that all information was salient, and that subjects performed
a somewhat simpler analysis than specified by our framework.
If this Is true, Kelley-s model, though somewhat useful,
may be incomplete In specifying precisely how Individuals
construct causal explanations In economic contexts.
How, then, might subjects have ascribed causes of these
economic events? The view that people employ complex information
processing strategies In prediction and attribution of events
has been challenged somewhat by recent theory and research.
There Is evidence that Individuals sometimes rely on general
principles or intuitive heuristics that reduce complex Judg-
mental tackr. to simpler operations (e.g.
, Kahneman & Tversky,
1971j AJzen,1977). In general, these Judgmental strategies
05
are ,uit. useful. but they ^ ^For example, an avaUabmtx heuristic aay operate when
people evaluate the frequency of events by the ease with which
relevant instances come to mind. While availability usually
is correlated with fluency, so.ti.es a few salient instances
will lead an attrlbutor to systematically overestimate the
frequency of a particular event.
Although research has uncovered only a small number of
simple strategies, it seems reasonable that they co-aid ope-ate
in other ways. One heuristic strategy that might have operate
would be to examine the consistency among belief, abuut
current income level and current opportunities, at a single
point in time. Kost consistency theorists assert that consistency
is pleasant and that people strive toward that state. Festin.er
(1955) provided a useful definition of psychological consistency.
In this regard, when cognitions are relevant to each other, one
cognition implies something about the other. The cognitions
may exist In either a consistent or inconsistent state. While
psychological consistency exists when one element Implies the
other, Inconsistency Is experienced when one element implies
the opposite of the other.
In the present experiment, one belief concerned current
outcome level
- the group was believed to be either affluent
or impoverished. A second belief concerned opportunities.
Subjects may have believed either that group opportunities
had improved or declined. Perhaps a simpler belief that
46
current opportunities were ei , *ther good or bad was more useful
or examining belief consistency. Slnce subjeots Mere giyeninformation reading one potential cause (le
. opportunity
change,, this information was probably particularly salient
to sublets at the time of their causal decision, m the
real world, subjects might „„t utilize this information, butits salience in the lab probably promotes its use.
In general, the beliefs "currently impoverished" and
"declined opportunities" may be consistent. The belief that
opportunity declined may lnpiy that the group ^
poor, presumably because there is a causal link. This latter
notion is supported by the finding that, m poverty conditions,
control causal judgments paralleled those of declined opportunity
subjects.
When the group is affluent, however,
"declined opportunities"
may imply the opposite of "currently affluent". Therefore,
inconsistency should result. To resolve this inconsistency,
a person should seek other explanations. Thus, inconsistency
could be resolved by concluding that internal causes are
responsible for affluence.
A simplifying strategy that relies on judgments of
consistency has been termed a consistency juristic (A jzen,l 9?7 )
.
This heuristic would usually be quite useful and yield results
that parallel those obtained by examining the covariation over
time of cause and effect. Thus, opportunities would typically
covary over time with income, and yield cognitions that are
^7
Psychologically consistent at the present tin. , -„lme point. That iscurrently impoverished" and
psychologically co„slstent beliefs and would typlcaUy
«.ult „ one perforoed an analysls specif fey ^ Mw
Principle. However. when incogs remain aeM ovor ^
a covariation analysis ana consistency analy Sis wuuld^
divergent results. If subjects rely on the consistency
heuristic, systemic errors would occur. The present study
demonstrates these systematic errors that result fro. utlilzation
of a consistency heuristic when lnco.es remain constant over
generations.
The preceding analysis suggests that there .ay be indiv-
idual differences in assessments of consistency MBBg partic-
ular beliefs. work ethic adherents who believe that poverty
derives primarily from internal forces ml.ht feel that information
about opportunities Implies very little about current income
level (le. the beliefs are not relevant). If so
.
these people
might not utiliza opportunity Information in their analyses.
However, the locus of control scale that was employed to tap
Individual differences In general beliefs about causation,
does not support this notion. Perhaps another measure more
specific to economic contexts Bight yield differences, but
there are no supportive data in this regard.
An alternative type of simplifying strategy might have
operated. Perhaps respondents were "lazy" processors who were
not strongly motivated to utilize the several bits of information.
The lazy processing explanation differs fro. the consistency
heuristic, while a change in motivation should largely
eliminate laziness, the heuristic interpretation suggests
that people will usually make errors
.regardless of motivation
level, because of an inability to deal with complexity. Thus
biases resulting from a heuristic are primarily cognitive,
while lazy processing is basically a motivational problem.
Future research might test these competing consistency
heuristic and Tazy processing explanations by manipulating
subjects' motivation to perform well. Motivation level should
have an impact mainly on lazy processing.
But why would subjects consistently utilize outcome level
and opportunity change information, but not outcome change
information? There may be a hierarchy of information
importance that determines the order in which people utilize
the various types of information. Lazy processes, or
those «ho use a consistency heuristic, may fail to employ
information that is relatively low in the hierarchy. In
this study, the dependent measures tap attributions of the
current outcome level, and so subjects must use that informa-
tion in order to respond to questions. Thus, current outcome
level information should be highest in the hierarchy.
In order to perform a cause and effect analysis, subjects
would need information regarding a potential cause of the
economic effect, and so that information might logically be
used second. The most likely hierarchy of information
importance, then, would be, from highest to lowest ,
^
outcome level, opportunity change, and outcome change.
A few words are in order concerning interpretation of the
results. As previously mentioned, several explanations are
plausible. Post hoc interpretations that certain information
was not salient, or that subjects used a consistency heuristic
or lazy processing, are necessarily speculative. Therefore,
future research *ight assess directly subjects' beliefs about
information consistency or information salience in economic
contexts such as those encountered by our subjects. Further,
research might use self-reports to explore the processes by
which people analyze information.
In addition, it is important to consider that the present
study attempts to test a. complicated information processing model
as well as increase our understaning of a complex real world
issue. In such an attempt, there is a problem of striking an
optimal balance between internal and external validity in order
to do justice to both the model and the social issue. This
study may have emphasized internal validity at the expense of
external validity. External validity may have been limited because
some of the information provided to subjects was perceived to be
ecologically nonrepresentative of the real world. For example,
subjects might have perceived that incomes of real world groups
(e.g., blacks) do not remain constant when opportunities improve
or decline. Constant income conditions, then, may have been
ecologically nonrepresentative of subjects' experiences. -.s a
result, sheets Day have ^.^^ thls
To address the lssue jf exterRai vsiuity> thia
originally included a d^siem k> oo
. ,
S1 " n t0 aSSess Wle'i views of poverty
oi real world groups. Unfortunate!^ thPt . ,lj
'
a design was eliminated
cme to time and resjurpp v mU „,.
mererore, future rese^c^
«*t lnTestiSate peopl6 . s vlew8 Jf^ ^ ^
world groups.
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APPENDIX 1
BACKGROUND INFORMATION A 3OUT RA3T0R0MNE
.\
7
The haetoromanen are a *Tan sth«i«in the Central European county if lu'trif Primarilyconsitute only 3;> (2^0,000) of Au tr? c ? ln2" ^^^^neninhabitants, they are jt i f nearlv 0 millionhaetoromanen tend to b2 corcentra^? wf 1?6 ° f ^T0? e ' ™*
ous, rural areas of the coSn?^ and in° g f'" T ° f the ^ntain-areas of Haetoromanen habitation J^JA w Ur?an cent^s. TheseAustria. The city of Breier£ EL J! ? he westerr- rerion of
of haetoromanen.
3 S^nz nas the largest single concentration
and t^iSSST^tSH^oSlW^ ^ SPeCi&1 CUSt- s
festival day./^;^^^^-^"- f» jorn primarily onand fine needlework. The It ? 6 intricat « embroidery
somewhat the American soL-p h«
tlonal /^etoroman dances resemble
These dances ar e accompanied ov vL??*
are
*anc?d 1" **ny variations,
five strongflddle found onlv in ?
USl
°' played on a uni ° ,Je
of Austria, they also hav? rH qm !^?7^ - national language
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APPENDIX 2
INCOME LEVEL AND INCOME CHANGES
GENERAL DESCRIPTION GIVEN TO ALL SUBJECTS i
econonL
Ce
suSation? *I* Zonllll*
C
~?^ «>• Raetoromanen
ethnic group was p bl h vea^- Austrlans bydata has not often been lnci«oratSS'irSl I* t^* 6thniC *rou?these current data can be chared »i- ? Austrian economic surveys,
survey conducted in tL^lda^-^'SoTSS7^/ Simllar
GhOUP CUmWTU AFFLUENT
,
INCOMES CONSTANT OVER GENERATIONS i
In comparison with otherIS tril raetoromanen were affluent,
distinctly aSove avera tllrl ^ f
af^romane" Incomes were
have re^Lect aU^thl saffif "vow ^J^6 ' ^aetor0ffia« Encores
In relation to other ^^^^Zs^^^^^ 11 aff^nt.
still distinctly above average.
"UStrlan socl ety, raetoromanen are
GfiOUP CURRENTLY IMPOVERISHED, INCOMES CONSTANT OVER GENE' ATIONS
i
omic XtuItilS*
- ?f^nstrated s^ e important facts about the econ-situat on, rlfty years ago, most Raetoromanen lived in covertvIn comparison with other Austrlans, Eaetoroman incomes we4 distinct
about tlV^tl Since . that Raetoroman incomes have remainedhe same. Now Raetoromanen are still poor. In relation to
below ™n.°f AUStrlSn S °Ciet^ raetoromanen are still distinctly
QhQW CUHH2NTLY IMPOVERISHED, INCOMES DECLT.r£L OVER GENERATIONS
i
The surveys demonstrated some important facts about the econ-omic situation. Rifty years ago, <rost 'riaetoroina^en were a^f n uent
In comparison with other Austrlans, Raetoromanen incomes weredistinctly above average. Since that time, however, Eaetoromanincomes have declined a great deal. Now Raetoromanen are rot
well off economically. In relation to other members of Austrian
society, Raetoromanen are now distinctly below average in income.
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APPENDIX 3
OPPORTUNITY CHAMP ATf-i,-11 CHANGES 0V2R GENERATIONS
OPPORTUNITIES DECLINED OVER GENEPRATIONS
i
the opportunities a
"
L r6P°rtS that
history. Over the last mty yearJ h?Ve an testingdeclined a great deal. This deoU™ ft*^*"1!* 1 ? - have actuallyfrom decreased funding comin* tS ihl S?>Port™ities stemmed
ment sources. In AustriafSSst tlrL !S, t!rn^eSl0n from ™vern-whlch then redistributes ionev to ?he Sfj2 ^ federal ^Vernment,various purposes. In recent pi 2u ff * rent reSions for
substantially reduced fundfto L S5§ feder&il ^ve™<^tlive. As a result, scnoSls reduced S««!m re " ion where ^«toromanenclass size, and were unable ^ ? teachin-c quality, increased
of materials and p£ys?cal SoSditE^SS wlt« the qualityFurthermore, finaScUl Sid £5 recced 2d-S'f? pr*v1^-were able to attend the rv™ ^ V 20 ewer Haet oromanen
Previous funds SSt Sad Sate rXna^d /?* UnlrrSltles 'were also greatly reduced ZlTr I industries and tourism
diminished and prrtwS iegislStiSn tlT\r°r?1« tT&inin* wasities for Raetoromanen was fepeSled? * Sp6Clal
I


